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In this summary we present the most important conclusions and recom-
mendations. For obvious reasons no room is devoted to argumentation here. It
is in the main text. References and tables are not included either. The study com-
prises references to more than 400 publications in Bulgarian and other languages
and 29 tables.
1. ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT – SUBSTANCE, NECESSITY,
SOURCES AND OBJECTIVES
The analysis provides a foundation for the following most important conclu-
sions and recommendations:
1.1. CONCLUSIONS OF GLOBAL AND REGIONAL IMPORTANCE
1.1.1. GLOBAL ECONOMIC DIVERGENCE
There is no unquestionable trend of sustainable global economic conver-
gence. It is not evident even between the three main development centres – the
US, Japan and the EU. The diverging level of developed and underdeveloped
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Ivan Angelovcountries creates the potential for the latter to develop more quickly and reduce
the divergence with the more advanced ones. This opportunity can only be
realised under a combination of appropriate economic and other conditions.
Creating such prerequisites is difficult and is rarely achieved. Some western
authors’ claims that the average speed of convergence is two percentage points
per annum are occasionally valid for some developed countries. Convergence is
often slower or absent, particularly between developed and less developed
economies.
Empirical proof does not confirm the hypothesis of global economic con-
vergence implied in the neo-classical models. There is no clear-cut trend for
more rapid development of the underdeveloped countries compared to the more
developed ones. The trend is a growing divergence in the levels of productivity
and GDP per capita. Even when the relative differences decrease, the absolute
ones grow larger. The only important exception are some countries in East and
Southeast Asia.
1.1.2. INCREASE OF SOCIAL POLARISATION
Accelerated economic growth goes along with an even more rapid increase
of social polarisation. In 1960, per capita GDP in the 20 richest countries
according to purchasing parity standards was 18 times higher than in the 20
poorest countries. By 2000 this spread was 40 times.
Rapid economic growth in itself is insufficient. It has to be for the benefit
of as many people as possible on a global, regional, national and domestic
regional scale. An increase of GDP can not be successful and sustainable if it is
only for the benefit of a small minority. History has confirmed this on many
occasions. This is relevant today too because regardless of the fact that history is
never repeated in full, its main aspects often are.
1.1.3. “ECONOMIC MIRACLES” CAN’T BE REPRODUCED
Neither economic theory nor economic practices have discovered easy solu-
tions and practical recipes for rapid economic convergence. Global experience
proves that“economic miracles” are a result of a unique combination of coun-
try specific favourable conditions, aggressive economic, institutional, social and
other policies, appropriate geographical location and a coincidence of circum-
stances in a specific historical context.
Progress in economic convergence is unique for any country. It is impossible
to replicate it in other countries and times. “Economic miracles” can be
explained post factum but they can not be reproduced. New “economic mira-
cles” can benefit from the lessons of the preceding ones but they will always con-
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020tain unique innovative national elements. Otherwise they would never happen!
Each country that wants an “economic miracle” has to “make it happen”.
1.1.4. DEVELOPMENT AS A TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY
According to the modern paradigms development does not boil down to tech-
nical change – accumulation of physical and human capital, financial stability,
higher labour productivity, competitiveness etc. As stated by J. Stiglitz, develop-
ment means a transformation of society. The contemporary understanding of
development does not assume development in general, but rather intensive, demo-
cratic, fair and sustainable development. Social innovation, however, should not
destroy the inherited, centuries-old traditional cultural and other national values.
It is important to produce. Productive activities however must be carried
out by healthy, highly skilled, free people who live in dignity and are capable of
managing their own fate in an environment of personal security. People who
know that in extremely unfavourable situations they can rely on the help of the
community, of the society represented by the state. These people must live in an
environment of openness, transparency, partnership and personal commitment
to shared ideals and take part in decision making on personal and public affairs.
Development as transformation requires something more than appropriate
economic policy and efficient institutions. The new theories of development as a
transformation of society along with the institutions stress the importance of dis-
tribution. The problems of normal stratification or social polarisation are very
important not only as development goals, but also as means for a more efficient
performance of the economy. Poor people suffer not only because of a lack of
means for their basic needs. They are powerless, helpless and insecure about
themselves and their families. They are unwanted and rejected by society. Given
such a social environment it is impossible to ensure a normal development of
society, let alone any accelerated development!
1.1.5. INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE
Theory is undecided as to whether integration always leads to economic
convergence.This is apparent when the strictest assumptions of the neo-classical
model are made more flexible, particularly the assumption that production tech-
nologies are identical and accessible to all countries. The poorly timed removal
of capital and labour market barriers between developed and less developed
countries can turn into a source of growing divergence. In some versions of the
endogenous growth and integration models it can induce divergence between
countries in terms of GDP per capita despite the fact that in principle it has a
positive overall effect.
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Ivan AngelovThe experience of the less developed EU cohesion countries (Ireland, Spain,
Portugal and Greece) proves that joining the European community did not
result in automatic convergence. It is a possibility that can be used (Spain,
Ireland and to a certain extent Portugal) or may not be used as in Greece. Its real-
isation presupposes the availability of a set of prerequisites – pro-active econom-
ic and other national policies of the member states is one of them. Even then
convergence takes not years but decades.
Bulgarian accession to the EU will take place under more difficult condi-
tions. First, Bulgaria is the least prepared of the applicant countries, which have
joined the EU so far. Second, Bulgaria committed to a very high pre-accession
price by closing four nuclear power reactors with a total capacity of 1760
megawatts. The losses and forgone benefits of this amount to several billions of
US dollars. Third,Bulgaria will receive less EU transfers per capita than the cohe-
sion countries did after their accession. Fourth, following accession Bulgaria will
have to face strong competitive pressure on the single internal market, which did
not exist when Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal joined. Fifth, Bulgaria will
accede at a time when the EU will be struggling with the inevitable problems of
the Eastern enlargement in 2004 in addition to the difficulties of its own internal
reforms. Any decision of a group of member countries to move faster leading to
a two-speed development of the EU would affect Bulgaria negatively. Sixth,
Bulgarian society is not psychologically prepared for accession. Politicians are
cultivating pre-accession illusions in the public, which will inevitably transform
into post-accession disillusionment.
The above, however is not an argument against Bulgarian accession to the
EU. For the simple reason that we don’t have a reasonable alternative. All other
scenarios are either unrealistic or inferior to EU accession. Moreover, the medi-
um and particularly long-term net effects of accession are positive for Bulgaria.
1.1.6. CONTROVERSIAL TRENDS IN CEECS
The trends in the CEECs have been controversial –both in the 40 years of cen-
tralised planning and in the 15 years of transformation. There is no trend of steady
convergence. The trend is towards lagging behind the most developed countries,
stagnation and internal divergence between the CEECs. Only some Central
European Countries (CECs) are slowly converging with the developed economies
of the EU-15. Bulgaria is lagging behind both the EU and the CE countries.
1.1.7. CONTROVERSIAL TRENDS IN REGIONAL CONVERGENCE
The trends in regional convergence are also controversial – in terms of
both the average EU level and average EU member country levels. There is slow
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020regional convergence in the most developed countries but regional divergence
continues in the less developed EU economies.
There is great regional divergence in the CEECs, which has even been grow-
ing over the past 10-15 years. Macroeconomic convergence of the less developed
countries with the average EU level continues along with an increase in the
national regional divergence. The higher the GDP growth in a country, the high-
er its internal regional divergence. This has been the case over recent decades. It
will persist in the coming decades.
1.2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
NATIONAL (BULGARIAN) IMPORTANCE
1.2.1. COMPOUNDING OF FUNDAMENTAL PROCESSES
The compounding of several major processes and simultaneous resolution
of several fundamental objectives in Bulgaria and in the countries of
Southeastern Europe slowed down reforms. They impeded the resolution of all
objectives – overcoming backwardness, carrying out market reforms and prepar-
ing for EU integration.
This all occurred against the harsh background of great losses and opportu-
nity costs to Bulgaria resulting from the UN embargoes against Iraq and former
Yugoslavia. In spite of the absence of ethnic or military conflicts in Bulgaria their
presence in neighbouring countries shed insecurity over Bulgaria and created
additional difficulties to transition and integration.
1.2.2. WRONG REFORM PHILOSOPHY
The International Financial Institutions applied wrong reform philosophy
and standard schemes inappropriate to Bulgarian conditions. They persued only
the means of economic policy, such as low inflation, low fiscal deficits, stable
exchange rate, etc. rather than fundamental objectives such as growth, employ-
ment, income, consumption, social justice, healthy environment, etc. The health,
the education, the social justice and even the life of the people were sacrificed to
the altar of financial stabilisation.
External and domestic reform designers imposed a forceful speedy privatisa-
tion at any price and tolerated crony privatisation. As a result very important
portion of the newly created private sector is not a bearer of positive
dynamism, entrepreneurship, innovation, respect of low and order. Such a
private sector does not respect loyal competition and fundamental national
interests. This makes Bulgarian private sector too different from the one existent
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Ivan Angelovin the advanced market economies. Such private sector is not likely to contribute
much to sustainable development.
The designers of reforms ignored the fact that there was no clear process of
market transformation in Bulgaria. The latter had to be paired with overcoming
economic, social, institutional and other backwardness.
In this complex setting the share of problems related to backwardness was
smaller in Bulgaria compared to African and Asian countries and Albania but
greater compared to the reforms in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia and Hungary. This was ignored when designing the reform models.
This made Bulgarian transformation more difficult and increased tremen-
dously its social costs. Very large portion of the Bulgarian population lives now
in great poverty, much larger than under central planning. The crime is flourish-
ing. This is not what the people expected from transition.
1.2.3. FUNCTIONING AND COMPETITIVE MARKET ECONOMY
It is far too early to claim that there is a normally functioning market econo-
my in Bulgaria! There are no real estate and capital markets, and the money, com-
modity and labour markets are in the initial phases of their development, which is
accompanied by severe deformations and criminal deviations. Due to the low
quality of reforms and crony privatisation Bulgaria has turned into an economic
minefield. The mines explode any time when the interests of the respective eco-
nomic groups are at stake. This will go on during the coming years and decades.
Bulgaria will not be able to develop a normally functioning and competi-
tive market economy in the short and medium term. Competitiveness may
become a reality only in the distant future – in 15-20 years. Normal relations
between the economic agents are often replaced by criminal tools for “settling
bills” - intimidation, blackmail, arson and assassinations. This creates a social,
economic and psychological environment that will be counterproductive to nor-
mal economic activity for many years to come.
The choice is clear – initiate accelerated development on a playing field that
has been cleared of crime and corruption or sustain economic and social stagna-
tion in an environment of crime and corruption. Bulgarian authorities do not
seem to understand that the country is at a crossroad.
1.2.4. TWO DEVELOPMENT ROUTES
Bulgaria can chose between two extreme routes of economic development
until 2020 and by 2050:
- Lagging behind development of about 2% annual average GDP growth, or
slow development of about 3%. Given PP standards, as well as expected average
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020annual EU-15 GDP growth of 2.0-2.5% the first scenario would result in 30-35%
of the per capita GDP of EU-15 by the middle of the century, or 40-45% accord-
ing to the second scenario. Bulgaria will be doomed to socio-economic stagna-
tion with grave strategic consequences.
- Accelerated or rapid accelerated development of 5.0-7.0% average annual
GDP growth. It is desirable to have average annual growth of 6-8% in the first
ten years, 5-6% in the next decade, 4-5% in the subsequent decade and 3-3.5%
beyond that. This development will not be smooth. From the point of view of
economic convergence it is crucial to have Bulgarian average annual growth
exceeding EU-15 growth 2.5-3.0 times. In this case Bulgaria will achieve a per
capita GDP of 50-55% of the EU-15 level by 2020 and 75-80% by 2050. Such a
favourable prospect is on the bortherline between the possible and the impossi-
ble. It requires full mobilisation of national energy as well as favourable external
conditions. World economic history proves that such a lucky combination is
rare.
1.2.5. FUNCTIONS, COMPONENTS AND RESOURCES OF THE STRATEGY
The strategy for development of society has several major functions. They
are: to define priorities; to co-ordinate; to contribute to attaining national con-
sensus; to serve as a catalyst for overall social change; to be a carrier of transfor-
mation ideas, prompted by internal needs; to cultivate ownership; to provide co-
operation between the state and the market.
The strategy must cover all components of society: development of the pri-
vate and the public sector, of the regional communities, of the family, of the indi-
vidual. The strategy should treat them as integral parts of society. It is impossible
to achieve sustainable development unless it encompasses each of these compo-
nents!
The strategy is a sound proposal only if backed with resources. ?hey include
physical, human and financial resources, efficient macro- and microeconomic
management, increase of knowledge, sectoral, subsectoral, regional and other
strategies as well as social and organisational capital.
1.2.6. FUNDAMENTAL PRIORITIES
The main task of the proposed strategy on priorities is to identify the areas of
sustainable development and the economic, institutional, social and other poli-
cies to be activated by the state and society.
The proposed strategy identifies the following fundamental priority areas
of sustainable development:
- improving healthcare and providing general access to health services;
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Ivan Angelov- upgrading the quality, widening the scope and improving access to edu-
cation;
- acquiring more state of the art knowledge leading to establishing a
“knowledge based society”;
- promoting research and development;
- structural and technological upgrading of the economy;
- developing a modern infrastructure;
- balanced development of the regions;
- promoting income stratification but restricting social polarisation;
- mitigating the negative consequences of the demographic crisis;
- protection and improvement of the environment;
- creating modern public institutions and NGOs and an efficient adminis-
tration.
- curtailment of crime and corruption
These general priorities are subject to specification by means of strategies and
programmes at sectoral, subsectoral, regional and company level to make them
operational. Companies must be free to develop their own strategies and priorities.
1.2.7. THE HUMAN BEING – THE MAJOR BENEFACTOR OF THE STRATEGY
Setting objectives is central to any development strategy. The main objective
of this strategy is the human being. Improving the quality of life is the major
reason to devise a strategy and implement economic policies.
Upgrading the quality of life is the main criterion as to whether a strategy or
an economic policy is sound. In the absence of improvement after an appropri-
ate time lag the reasons should be sought in the design of the strategy and eco-
nomic policy. Policy, which does not lead to better quality of life is not an appro-
priate one.
In a traditional strategy the only development objective is GDP growth.
GDP, however, does not reflect sufficiently the quality of life of the people. It is a
very important prerequisite for wellbeing but is not a reliable measure of it. Such
a measure isthe sustainable development indicatorthat covers economic, social
and environmental dimensions. The economic, social and environmental objec-
tives interact and enhance each other. This results in powerful synergies.
1.2.8. A SYSTEM OF DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, GDP is a very important aggregate indi-
cator for economic development. There is no better indicator for operational
purposes. The attempts to construct an aggregate indicator for sustainable devel-
opment have not been completed so far.
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020In order to compensate for the shortcomings of the GDP, we usea pyramid
system of target indicators. GDP tops the pyramid. There are the four impor-
tant aggregate objectives – economic development, social development,
healthy environment and stable democracy in the middle layer. There are a
large number of more concrete objectives that specify each of the four groups
of aggregate objectives in the base of the pyramid. The political objectives are
not covered in this strategy while the social and environmental ones - only par-
tially.
1.2.9. ENDS AND MEANS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The main objective of the accelerated sustainable development is to improve
the quality of people’s lives measured with GDP per capita and the system of eco-
nomic, social and environmental indicators.
The means for attaining strategic objectives are the monetary, fiscal and for-
eign economic policies, employment and income policies, structural, invest-
ment, science and technology, educational and health policies, demographic pol-
icy, infrastructure upgrading policy, etc.
In more specific terms, a low inflation, balanced budget, balanced current
account, stable exchange rate, foreign exchange reserve, moderate indebtedness
and others are important means of economic policies, not their objectives.
Maintaining low budget deficit or surplus (as it was in 2003) by reducing
investment in infrastructure and expenditures for healthcare, education and
research has a negative impact on growth in the medium and long term. This
generates negative consequences for employment, income, consumption,
healthcare, education, research and ultimately - for the quality of life! This may
balance the budget in the short run but at a too high cost – an unhealthy and
uneducated generation growing up in Bulgaria, as it is now the case! The health
and education of the population have much higher value in ranking public
objectives than a temporarily balanced budget!
In all CEE countries where the IMF has had stand-by agreements over the
last decade the objectives of economic policies were confused with their means.
Bulgarian governments shared the same philosophy of transformation.
Confusing the ends with the means of economic policy leads to self-deception,
slows transformation, makes it more expensive and has grave consequences for
the life of the population
1.2.10. ECONOMIC GROWTH SCENARIOS
We assume under the above-mentioned conditionalities that the per capita
GDP is a very important aggregate indicator for economic development and, to
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Ivan Angelovsome extent, for the quality of people’s life. The standard of life depends to a
great extent (but not fully) on the dynamics of growth of per capita GDP.
Six scenarios have been constructed for the average annual per capita GDP
growth by 2020, and for the sake of reflection – until 2050. These are at GDP
growth of 3%, 4%, 4.5%, 5.0%, 5.5% as well as a flexible realistic scenario (5.5%)
until 2020, gradually falling to 3% over the period 2041-2050 (see chart).
We recommend the scenarios of 5.0-5.5% average annual growth by 2020
to the authorities. Given the same starting point of 2000 with an average annual
growth of 5.0% (and for the EU-15 of 2.0% until 2010 and 2.5% for 2011-2020),
in 2020 Bulgaria can reach approximately 50% of the expected per capita GDP
level of EU-15. In the case of 5.5% average annual growth Bulgaria could reach
about 55% of the expected level of this index for the EU-15. This is an immense-
ly difficult task. It verges on the impossible but could be achieved with a full
mobilisation of national energy and favourable external conditions.
The recent economic history of Bulgaria (1950-1990) shows that an average
annual growth of 5.0-5.5% over a 20-year period is not inconceivable evaluated
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020in the light of the present criteria impacted by the deep crisis of transition. These
comparisons, however, must be made carefully. There are differences in circum-
stances between the two periods that can impede the achievement of steady
growth now. There are also differences in circumstances that can make it easier.
It is difficult to say which of the two will prevail.
1.2.11. ECONOMIC TARGET INDICATORS
Setting the objectives based only on GDP growth implies a great risk of
strategic mistakes. In order to compensate for the imperfection of GDP we rec-
ommenda system of economic and related target indicators and set their tenta-
tive numerical levels or trends until 2010 and 2020. They are:
- productivity and competitiveness,
- employment,
- income and consumption,
- education and training,
- digital literacy,
- mitigation of the demographic crisis,
- balanced regional development and local self-government,
- free migration and labour mobility.
We recommend several additional analytical target indicators for each of
them and make quantitative and qualitative estimates for their levels and/or
trends for the 2010 and 2020 horizon. Altogether 30 economic target indicators
are used.
1.2.12. SOCIAL TARGET INDICATORS
To compensate for the imperfection of GDP we recommend a system of
social and related target indicators with estimations until 2010 and 2020. They
are:
- fair distribution and social cohesion,
- access to health service,
- social protection for the needy,
- protection of consumer rights,
- social inclusion,
- healthy working environment,
- high quality of labour and flexible professional careers,
- awareness and preparedness for transformations in the family and for
the life style changes.
For each of those that can be quantified we recommend several analytical tar-
get indicators and estimate their level and/or trends until 2010 and 2020. For the
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Ivan Angelovrest we offer a description of the expected trends. Altogether 25 social and related
target indicators are used.
Todayonly a society that provides prerequisites for its members to income
based on merit is successful. The industrious and knowledgeable generate more
wealth and must acquire more than the incompetent and passive. Each infringe-
ment of this fundamental principle suppresses the incentives for work, knowl-
edge and entrepreneurship. Without these qualities society is doomed to stagna-
tion and a fatal end. The normal social and economic development presumes
moderate income stratification, but no income polarisation. Social polarisation
makes accelerated economic development impossible whereas moderate social
stratification boosts it.
1.2.13. ENVIRONMENTAL TARGET INDICATORS
Bearing in mind that the protection of the environment is the third major
pillar of sustainable development we share some ideas and recommend target
indicators. We define environmental efficiency and its importance and investi-
gate the link between GDP growth on one side and use of raw materials, energy,
water, transport services and harmful emissions – on the other.
We propose five groups of measures for de-coupling environmental pres-
sures from economic growth. This will help easing environmental pressure
while accelerating growth. Environmental resources are and in the forthcoming
decades will become even scarcer production factor than the traditional
resources – labour, capital and land.
This is even more indispensable considering that environmental degrada-
tion has reached a scale that endangers the future of mankind. The seemingly
weaker pressure on the environment over recent years is mainly due to reduced
economic activity, rather than owing to efficient environmental policy.
Environmental pressures will grow again to dangerous levels in the coming years
and decades with the expected revival of economic activity despite more up to
date production patterns and technologies.
Bulgaria needs a long-term strategy for the protection of environment as an
integral component of sustainable development.
1.2.14. LABOUR PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT
Labour activity and participation are changing slowly. Population decline
will go on in the coming decades. The population in the active age will also
decrease. Even in the case of stabilisation of labour participation the possibilities
for GDP growth will be restricted under constant working time utilisation and
labour productivity. In the case of a moderate decrease of labour participation,
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020the impact on potential economic growth will be even more negative. It will be
compounded by the worsening age composition of the labour force.
Bulgaria can, however, increase significantly the number of the employed
until 2020 and beyond by increasing the participation and the employment
rates. This increase will be most significant in the first decade and in the first half
of the second decade. It will decline towards the end of the second decade by
reducing unemployment to normal levels. By the beginning of the third decade
this potential will be exhausted and so will its favourable impact on economic
growth. The negative impact of decreasing employment beyond that can only be
compensated with better utilisation of working time and higher productivity.
This can also be aided by immigration of work force.
By 2020 and in the decades thereafter there will be a great potential to
increase the total number of worked man-hours. This growth potential will
exist even under unchanged labour productivity. Considering that the latter
will also grow Bulgaria will have significant economic growth potential in
terms of available working time in days and hours per employed person
although total number of employment will decline in subsequent decades.
Using this potential will depend on the economic policy. The labour force will
not be an obstacle for accelerated development in the coming decades despite
the decrease in it’s size.
1.2.15. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
By 2020 and beyond Bulgaria will rely on a manifold increase of labour
productivity as a major factor of socio-economic progress. Whereas total work-
ing time will grow in percentage terms, the increase of labour productivity will be
manifold. If until 2020 per capita GDP grows by 5.5% per annum on average and
if 60% of this growth is due to higher labour productivity, it would have to grow
by 3.3% on average, and towards the end of the period – by 1.9 times. If produc-
tivity accounts for 70% of GDP growth on average for the entire period, until
2050 it can grow approximately 6 times compared to 2000.
Taking into account the demographic and migration prospects the major
sources for extensive growth by means of the labour force will be “depleted”
by 2025-2030. If the current demographic trends remain unchanged, the main
and even single source for accelerated development in the coming decades will be
the growing labour productivity. It will maintain its decisive role even in the case
of a significant turn of the migration flows after 2020-2025. The return of some
of the highly skilled emigrants may even speed up this process.
Various scenarios for substitution between labour and physical capital are
possible. In the countries where labour costs are high there is a tendency to
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Ivan Angelovreplace labour with capital by rapid increases of the capital/labour ratio. There
are no economic prerequisites in Bulgaria for fast substitution during the first
and probably during the second decade due to the low cost of labour. With time
labour cost will grow in parallel with labour quality and productivity, but they
will hardly reach levels which will speed up labour’s substitution with physical
capital by 2020. The process will become more apparent during the third decade
and beyond. This will provide the technical and economic foundations for an
even faster increase of labour productivity.
1.2.16. TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
Total factor productivity will play a growing role for maintaining accelerat-
ed growth in the first and even more so in the second decade and beyond. In the
5.5% annual GDP growth scenario until 2020, 30-40% thereof will be attribut-
able to total factor productivity. This share will be 15-20% in the first decade,
and 40-50% in the second. In the decades thereafter the share of total factor pro-
ductivity can stabilise around 55-65%. The expected technological and other
innovations and further deterioration of the demographic crisis can make a
higher share of total factor productivity in GDP growth in certain periods possi-
ble or even indispensable.
Some believe that intensive growth will follow immediately under a high-
tech oriented development, such as ICT, biotechnology etc., paired with non-
technological elements.
This is a complicated process. A long period of economic maturing is neces-
sary until the results of a modern economic development become effective. The
so-called Paradox of Sollow is a good illustration.
This paradox, however, prompts an important conclusion for Bulgarian
economic policy. Rapid changes are essential if 30-40 and more years are needed
for tangible results to emerge after technological and other innovations were
implemented. If this applies to the most developed countries, it is even more
essential for a small and not well-organised economy like that of Bulgaria.
In order to gain time the technological, structural, institutional and other
innovations in Bulgaria must start sooner and on a larger scale. The sooner the
changes the sooner the results will become evident (after the essential lag).
Unlike developed countries, Bulgaria can not reduce the time for economic
maturing. It can, however, prolong it by delayed action. It does not seem that
Bulgarian policy makers are aware of this.
Under current conditions Bulgaria will hardly have to wait for 30-40 years
before the results of the technological innovations appear in the economic statis-
tics. If we want these to transpire sooner, albeit marginally in the second and
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020third decade, and to have them feed through to accelerated development we
must act now – in 2004-2007 - and on a larger scale in the following years.
2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICIES TO
ACHIEVE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
2.1. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Government’s main role is to provide an appropriate economic, institution-
al, social and political environment for business activities. The government
should not be a business entity except in rare cases. It creates a healthy business
climate by means of economic, institutional and other policies. It drafts the laws
and sees to their unconditional enforcement. International experience has
proven that no one performs these functions better than the government.
The government performs its functions in co-operation with the market
and not in opposition to it. Their relations are complementary rather than sub-
stitutable. One must apply the constructive principle of “both government and
market” instead of the naïve destructive schemes of “government or market”.
This primitive construct has not functioned anywhere.
The government must provide equal conditions for the performance of both
the private and public sector. They must operate in a competitive market envi-
ronment and be equal before the law.
2.2. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES OF ECONOMIC POLICY
The traditional concept of “priority areas” in the strategies for economic
development from the times of central planning was to outline directly or indi-
rectly what, how, where and how much was to be produced and to whom and at
what price it was to be delivered. The sectors, sub-sectors and products to be
developed were specified in advance – in terms of volume, investment projects,
technologies, employment etc. The time of such strategies has passed along with
the rejection of central planning and the transition towards a market economy.
We do not share this concept of priorities. Neither do we agree with the
current government intuitive choice of selected priority areas: new technologies,
tourism, agriculture and infrastructure. These priorities are too general to be
meaningful.
Priority areas of public policy include ?reating appropriate economic, insti-
tutional, social and other environment for entrepreneurship, research and devel-
opment under clearly defined rules. These rules comprise fair competition, health
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Ivan Angelovstandards, social justice, clear environment, personal and property civil security,
equality before the law, national security and other major national values.
The formulation and implementation of development strategy with its prior-
ities depends on the market and on the changes in the internal and external envi-
ronment. Within this general framework market agents decide what, how
much, how, where and when to produce, as well as to whom and how to sell,
how to organise the production process and the relations between the business,
social and other partners.
Specific strategies and priorities at sub-sector, company and product level
must be devised by the businesses, while government should help in implemen-
tation by creating appropriate economic and institutional environment.
The government must monitor and interfere only with respect to compli-
ance with the law. Effectiveness must be the concern of the business entities,
which act on their own account and responsibility. They bear the full risk for
their action or inaction.
The government can also initiate the formulation of specific priorities in
the areas of science, research and development, healthcare, education, consumer
protection, social inclusion, demographic issues, environment protection, infra-
structure development, regional development, suppression of crime and corrup-
tion and others. It should discuss ideas with the businesses and other social part-
ners, with academia, regional communities and NGOs.
The government must back its priority initiatives by providing appropriate
economic and other environment for their implementation and in some cases
even funding. Each level makes decisions on priorities independently by taking
the overall government strategic framework into account. The respective parties
should be free to deviate from government priorities at their own initiative and
responsibility.
2.3. TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS FROM ECONOMIC POLICIES TO ECONOMIC GROWTH
One can assume that financial stability, technological and other innovations,
skills and other factors have a positive impact on economic growth. This is bene-
ficial, but insufficient. These causalities must be proven empirically as well. No
such in-depth research has been conducted in Bulgaria so far largely due to unre-
liable and insufficient information.
The study comprises an attempt to model economic growth in Bulgaria and
prove the existence of such causality. This problem, however, requires more
empirical research to draw firm conclusions.
The solution lies in the use of evidence from other countries where such
studies have been conducted. Provided that conditions in these countries are by
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020and large comparable to those in Bulgaria this would give grounds to expect that
such causality may exist here. If certain cause and effect relationships are appar-
ent in many countries, there will be reason to expect that they will apply to
Bulgaria too even though their strength may not be the same.It is important that
the dependent variable responds to the changes in the independent variable.
By means of such an analysis we identify a set of production factors that
have strong enough impact on productivity and GDP. If the regression analysis
proves the existence of a cause and effect link economic policy should focus on
activating these production factors.
We consider the following dependent variables: GDP growth, labour pro-
ductivity growth, total factor productivity growth, economic convergence. The
following independent variables are used: investment, available physical and/or
human capital stock, restructuring of the economy, R&D expenditures, public
spending from the budget, taxation, inflation, financial development, openness
of the national market, deregulation, competition etc.
The analysis gives grounds to assume that economic policy priorities for
achieving accelerated development in Bulgaria over the coming decades can be
as follows:
- macro-economic stability;
- regulation, deregulation, competition and entrepreneurship;
- openness of the economy towards global markets;
- investment in physical and human capital;
- high level of employment and utilisation of working time;
- appropriate income policy;
- tolerance of social divergence but not of social polarisation;
- mitigating the consequences of the demographic crisis;
- active innovation policy;
- break-through science and technology development (ICT, biotechnolo-
gy etc.);
- updating of consumer and production patterns;
- financial system development and resource mobilisation;
- appropriate institutional policies;
- efficient environmental policies.
2.3.1. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY2
Macroeconomic stability implies stability of both the production and the
financial systems. The stability of the production system is the core of the sta-
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Ivan Angelov
2 Due to limited space only 7 out of 14 economic policy priorities are reviewed here briefly. For details
see the extended summary in English on the web sites, cited at the beginning.bility of the macroeconomic system. Financial stability is a function of the sta-
bility of production. A sustainable financial stability is impossible without sus-
tainable growth. Of course the reverse is also true, but the productive macro- and
microsystems and their stability lie at the root of the macroeconomic system and
its stability. The cause-effect links between them are two-way, but the impulse
from the production to the financial system is dominant.
The financial system ultimately serves the production of wealth and not vice
versa. The fundamental goal of production is to meet the needs of the people.
In the coming 20 years Bulgaria should have a price policy that complies
with at least three requirements: stability and predictability, an environment
appropriate for growth and a gradual convergence to EU price levels. It is obvi-
ous that there will be high inflation according to the criteria of the neo-classicists
and that this will have an impact on interest rates, income policy and the
exchange rate. From this point of view the current low inflation is a defect of the
system rather than indicator of long-term stability.
Evaluating the permissible inflation over the next 20 years, we need to take
account that this will be a period of convergence to the EU on all important eco-
nomic indicators including average price and income levels. At a projected aver-
age annual inflation in the EU of approximately 2% over the next decades,
Bulgaria should allow for average annual inflation of between 8 and 10% to
increase the domestic price level about 3 times over 15-20 years, i.e. to converge
with the EU price level.
The economic policy of Bulgaria over the coming decades must strive for the
lowest possible unemployment and lowest possible inflation. Ultimately a
compromise is necessary instead of sacrificing employment for the sake of low
inflation or vice versa. This conclusion is valid for Bulgaria and countries in sim-
ilar conditions. The conditions in the developed European countries are some-
what different including the levels and the relations between inflation and unem-
ployment.
We adhere to a more flexible perception of a balanced budget. This is a
budget that is balanced over a longer horizon of 15-20 years with permissible
annual deviations of up to ±2-3%. In years of economic decline a deficit of a cou-
ple of points is permissible whereas in years of high growth a surplus of a couple
of points should be maintained. In extreme situations one can allow for higher
deficits provided that non-inflationary financing is available and the public
indebtedness does not grow to dangerous levels.
Budget policy must serve the attainment of fundamental national objec-
tives. Bulgaria now prepares for EU accession being the least developed among
applicant countries – lowest GDP per capita, lowest productivity and competi-
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
A
n
n
a
l
s
 
n
o
 
1
6
0
,
 
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
0
4
 
-
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
2
0
0
4
25
Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020tiveness, lowest income level, highest unemployment, agonising healthcare, edu-
cation and science systems, poorest infrastructure, poorest compliance with
environmental, sanitary-hygienic and other accession standards. Closing part of
the gap before and immediately after accession requires major investment effort
by the Government and the private sector. This effort must be supported by the
budget by way of a higher deficit for certain period of time.
We do not share the view of strictly balanced budget at any price and any
time. Balanced budget is desirable as a means for achieving strategic objectives
but strictly balanced budget each year is not the highest value to a society.
Bulgaria was the only CEE country with budget surplus in 2003, but was the least
prepared for EU accession
The notion of a balanced current account should also be handled in a flexi-
ble manner. A deficit of 4-6% is acceptable in individual years. Deficits can be
tolerated for a longer period when the main causes are the import of investment
goods and/or other stable sources for compensation are available.
Maintaining a large current account deficit for a long time is dangerous,
since it increases external indebtedness and destabilises the budget. This is espe-
cially relevant for Bulgaria because of the current high external indebtedness and
the imminent large internal spending and imports in preparation for EU acces-
sion. One must explore a compromise between these in the name of accelerated
growth.
The healthiest way of balancing the current account is boosting competi-
tive exports. This in tern requires measures to upgrade competitiveness. This is
the policy to be persued in Bulgaria over the following years and decades. We do
not share the present policy to balance the current account mainly through a
strictly balanced budget.
The exchange rate will have an important role to play when making these
hard decisions. Bulgaria already suffers from the exchange rate peg to the Euro
(DM) introduced in July 1997. The pegged rate becomes particularly dangerous
with an appreciating EURO, as has been the case lately. If appreciation goes on as
it looks like losses will grow to a scale that can hardly be borne in the current
state of the economy.
At first glance, losses due to the expensive BGN in the area of exports are bal-
anced by the benefits in imports and external debt service. But the agents who
export differ from both these who import and of the budget. The losses incurred
by export manufacturers are not compensated to them by the benefits to the
importers and to the budget and vice versa. Stagnation and even bankruptcies of
exporting companies due to appreciating BGN will jeopardise future revenues to
the budget and the current account and hence their stability.
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Ivan AngelovIf this persists, the expensive BGN can trigger bankruptcies of exporting
companies, can destabilise the economy and suppress growth. This is the cost
that Bulgaria is already paying for adhering to a pegged exchange rate. This may
have severe consequences for businesses and consumers, for instance a shock
immediately after accession.
The convergence of prices is related to the currency board arrangement
with its inherent low inflation and fixed exchange rate, which make the conver-
gence of Bulgarian prices and income to these in the EU impossible. Bulgarian
politicians tend to disregard these problems in spite of the signals we have been
conveying over the past years. The authorities are opting for a surprisingly short-
sighted approach on such fundamental issues for the future of the nation. The
longer the delay in tackling these issues, the more difficult and painful it will be
to resolve them.
The fiscal and current account policy will determine debt policy to a great
extent. The latter should be a policy of a moderate overall indebtedness. On the
one hand, Bulgaria needs external investment loans and direct foreign invest-
ment for accelerated innovation of production capacities, of infrastructure, for
the protection of environment and other areas of activity. On the other hand,
one must take consideration of indebtedness. This necessitates looking for com-
promises, once again for the sake of accelerated growth.
The macroeconomic stability policy in the coming 20 years could be
expressed in numerical terms. These are: average annual GDP growth of 5.0-
5.5% (6-7% for the first decade), reducing unemployment to 4-6% by the end of
the period, an average annual inflation of 8-10%, an average annual budget
deficit of 1.5-2.0%, an average annual current account deficit of about 5%, total
indebtedness of 50-65%.
2.3.2. COMPETITION AND TYPES OF PROPERTY
The fundamental principles of mainstream economics assume private prop-
erty and competition as preconditions for sound economic performance.
Neither of them existed in Bulgaria. They are in the process of being established.
The emphasis is, however, confined to private property only.
Privatisation as the focus of transformation is being justified with motiva-
tion. Privatisation is claimed to be the only mechanism capable of inducing eco-
nomic motivation for delivering efficient economic activity. This may be true
for a small business but is not so for the medium size and large companies
where the functions of ownership and management are split. Privatisation,
therefore, is necessary but insufficient for creating an efficient motivational
mechanism.
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
A
n
n
a
l
s
 
n
o
 
1
6
0
,
 
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
0
4
 
-
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
2
0
0
4
27
Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020The managers act in a market environment where no one is interested in the
specific institutional and corporate makeup of the company that has manufac-
tured a commodity. Only price and quality matter to the buyer. They depend
mainly on the competitive environment in which production and sales take
place.
International practice offers thousands of examples of well managed state
owned companies and of poorly managed private businesses. The reverse is
equally true. Companies go into bankruptcy not because of the type of their
ownership, but due to poor management. Naturally there is a correlation
between the ownership (shareholders) and the quality of management. But such
equally strong correlation exists between the competitive environment and qual-
ity of management. Even the best private company tends to abuse its monopoly
status.
The relations between shareholders and managers of medium size and large
companies and their ability to influence each other have always been complex. In
the era of globalisation they are even more complex and the boundaries between
them are indistinct. The importance of managers is increasing for the perfor-
mance of companies in general and particularly of large corporations and multi-
nationals.
The quality of management is impacted also by the pressure of stakeholders
– the people working in the company, those living in the neighbourhood, the
community, the trade unions, the budget as a tax collector and the social security
system as a social security contributions collector. The suppliers of a company
and other partners are also interested in its good performance and exercise con-
structive pressure on its management.
There are no simple, one-way and permanently valid relations in the modern
economy. Private property is important, but it is no less important (and is
becoming increasingly important) to have a competitive environment. Private
property and competition have to complement rather than contradict each
other. Relations between the two are relations of mutual complementarity and
not of substitution. Competition is a powerful driving force of the modern econ-
omy, and so is private property. Splitting them and opposing one to the other
impedes the normal functioning of the economy.
A private sector based economy can not develop without competition
because private monopoly suffocates it. It “buys” governments and MPs, and
sharpens social polarisation. International experience provides numerous exam-
ples of socio-economic stagnation and chronic political instability under a total
dominance of the private sector but weak state and lack of competition such as in
Central and Latin America, Africa and southern Asia.
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Ivan Angelov2.3.3. HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY
The economic and social convergence of Bulgaria to the EU is impossible
without convergence of human capital in both quantitative and qualitative
terms. Bulgaria can not prosper without a modern system of education. The
authorities tend to neglect this obvious truth.
The participation of the state in maintaining the health, education and
skills of the citizens is of fundamental importance for Bulgaria’s develop-
ment. The state should involve the private sector but these very important
and delicate matters that go far beyond commercial interest can’t be entrust-
ed entirely to the private sector. Measures for health and education do not
bring about results quickly and are largely outside the scope of the private
enterprise.
Complex literacy is needed nowadays. This means reading and writing in
the native language; solid foreign language skills; digital literacy, ability for indi-
vidual and team work; analytical skills; communication skills; independence in
learning and in life.
A fundamental concern of the state should be to secure access to healthcare
and education for all citizens. Depriving the poor and their children of health-
care and education deprives the society of people who may prove to be great tal-
ents. And more importantly, it deprives many Bulgarians of a fundamental
human right – the right to life, health and knowledge.
In the absence of state intervention, economic polarisation leads to social
polarisation that nurtures educational polarisation. It intensifies digital devide,
which in turn deepens social and economic polarisation.
Without state intervention and EU assistance the polarisation processes can
become even more dangerous for Bulgaria due to the severe economic situation
and the current state of education. The absence of measures in this area will
make accelerated development impossible. Educational polarisation, coupled
with deterioration of quality of education may have grave long-term conse-
quences for the Bulgarian economy and the society at large.
The deepening educational polarisation and leaving the problem of complex
literacy unresolved harbours the danger of leaving Bulgaria at the economic,
social and intellectual periphery of Europe, as is the case nowadays. No accelerat-
ed development is possible in such an environment.
Education requires large resources – public and private financing, profes-
sional expertise, technical and other infrastructure, subsidies for the municipali-
ties, support by the parents. The result depends on the size of the expenditures
but also on their composition and management.
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020The strategy recommends that the expenditures of Bulgaria for education
grow from 3.8% of GDP in 2000 to 6.5-7.5% in 2010 and 8-9% by 2020. The
intention is that the cumulative education of the population within the 15 to 65
age bracket should grow from 8.4 years per capita in 2000 to 10 years in 2010 and
11.5 by 2020.
Financial allocations for education are very important but they should not
be exaggerated. Larger public spending does not automatically lead to better
quality of education. Prior to providing additional resources to the education
system, it has to be rationalised. Only then will resources be used in an effective
manner.
The larger part of education expenditures in Bulgaria is provided by the
state. This is also the case in the EU countries. The dominant role of the state in
this area must continue. This function can be performed in various ways. The
most widely used is and will be the financing of public schools, which spend the
funds according to certain rules.
Particular attention must be given to improvements in the quality of educa-
tion, which is mediocre and deteriorating. The minds of Bulgarian students must
become thinking machines and not depositories for facts, dates and numbers,
whichthey may never need.
2.3.4. MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS
The demographic crisis in Bulgaria is deteriorating rapidly. It will be one of
the most serious challenges in the coming decades. This crisis coincides and
even exceeds similar problems in Western Europe in spite of an economic and
social development, which lags that of Western Europe by 40-50 years. The cur-
rent demographic problems in Western Europe are, according to claims of its
analysts, the result of a demographic maturity. In Bulgaria they are the fallout of
a state of crisis. Hence, we are decades behind in terms of social and economic
developmentand decades ahead in terms of the manifestations of this crisis.
One must opt for a cautious increase in the retirement age. This requires
early measures for improving living and working conditions, healthcare, life-
long learning measures and the transition to an “active old age”. Given the cur-
rent difficult living and working conditions, increasing the pension age would be
impossible since people at that age already suffer physiological and mental
exhaustion.
These measures can be used for the 65+ age group to encourage them to
stay on the labour market for longer. One can introduce further incentives and
support in terms of gradual retirement from active labour activity by combining
work with rest, a wider application of part-time employment, work from home,
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Ivan Angelovconsultancy over the Internet etc. This will be possible in the second, particularly
in the third decade and beyond, when a significant growth of life expectancy and
an overall improvement of the general health of the elderly are expected.
One of the consequences of the demographic crisis is the deterioration of the
ratio between employed and unemployed. In this country it is one of the most
unfavourable in Europe at approximately 0.8:1 (which also includes the people
working in the shadow economy) and is deteriorating. In the EU countries the
ratio between employed and unemployed is three times higher.
The composition of the employed and of the unemployed raises additional
concerns. This is because the share of the young and the students is shrinking,
the share of adults is growing and the share of the long-term unemployed is very
high. The number of retirees in Bulgaria compared to the employed was 2.5-3.0
times higher than the EU average in 2000.
The ageing of the Bulgarian work force is becoming more and more appar-
ent.In the future it will be accompanied with an upward movement of the retire-
ment age. On the one hand, the share of the young people in the work force, the
groups under 25 and fewer than 35 years will fall. On the other hand, the share of
the working people between 55 and 64 years and above 64 will grow. Toward the
end of the second and particularly in the 3rdand the 4thdecade, with the expected
increase of life expectancy (75—77 years for men and 80-82 for women) the
share of the working people older than 65 will grow.
This sets new problems for Bulgaria. A mass introduction of the life-long
learning will have to be accelerated, particularly for the work force of the middle
aged and elderly generation. This is because the enhanced development of sci-
ence and technology speeds up the ageing of knowledge. By 2015-2020 the
major part of present knowledge of the work force will be obsolete. This fact
speaks for the scale of the challenge. It will require radical changes in the educa-
tion system and in training outside it. The life-long learning system will become
increasingly important.
The ageing of the population is exerting stronger pressure on public
finances.It will grow in the coming decades due to larger number of pensioners,
larger average pension, additional costs of healthcare and other services for the
elderly. We estimate that additional expenditure of 6.5-7.5 percentage points of
GDP will be needed by 2020. This has to be added to the 8% registered in 2000.
Judging by the experience of the EU member states the additional expenditures
may be even higher than this estimate.
Stabilising public finances is also a priority task for Bulgaria against the
background of the growing demographic pressure. This task will be very diffi-
cult considering the incredibly low level of pensions and the imperative need for
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020their increase. One could add to this the danger of shocks (bankruptcies and
other collapses) in the private pension funds, the large public debt and the neces-
sity for an active budget policy for EU accession. The expected burden of pension
expenditures, about 13-15% of GDP by 2020, will be very severe indeed.
Gradual increases in the pension age must be prepared, which goes along
with providing the option to continue work to all that chose to do so. This will be
harder to apply while there is high unemployment, but will become essential
after 2015-2020 when this problem will be resolved and the consequences of the
demographic crisis become more severe.
No single measure can resolve the problem. The stability of the budget and
of the social security system in the conditions of an ageing population can only
be resolved by means of a complex set of interrelated measures. High growth will
be central to this.
2.3.5. ALLEVIATING SOCIAL POLARISATION AND ALIENATION
Bulgaria has the highest social polarisation in CEE – a Gini coefficient of
0.41. It is higher only in the CIS countries.
No accelerated development is possible given such social polarisation.
Successful development in a country of 7.8 million people is unthinkable when
2.5 million are doomed to severe poverty and are isolated from the benefits of
human civilisation. This is not due to the state’s insufficient financial resources
but mainly to the irrational in economic and social terms distribution of these
resources. A small minority of 2-3% appropriates in criminal and semi-criminal
ways a part of wealth that is much larger than their contribution to its generation
and in doing so deprives the majority from their share. The government not only
tolerates, but also by withholding active measures, contributes to the increase of
income polarisation.
The state has ignored the poor and unemployed and has isolated them for
more than a decade. They have responded with total alienation and growing
hostility to the state and society. There can be no normal social and economic
development and civil peace in such a society, let alone any accelerated sustain-
able development. World experience over the past century as well as the compar-
ative analysis of the social and economic development of Africa and Southeast
Asia over the past 50 years has proved this. 
Alleviating social polarisation by means of changing distribution relations
and inclusion of the alienated is one of the most important measures, which
the Bulgarian government must address immediately. This, however, can not
be done quickly because of the large scale of poverty and the weakened state-
hood.
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Ivan AngelovAccelerated social and economic development implies encouraging income
divergence, based on contribution by labour, capital and entrepreneurship of
various groups, but restricting social polarisation.
2.3.6. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INNOVATION POLICY
Bulgaria’s internal innovation potential is restricted. It can provide no more
than 10-15% of the core technological and other innovations it needs for eco-
nomic and social development in the next two decades. The main source for
technological and other innovations will be FDI, EU transfers, import of invest-
ment goods, projects and contacts with foreign experts, import of know-how,
scholarships for Bulgarian scientists and other professionals abroad.
Bulgaria must be prepared. This calls for accelerated development of educa-
tion, of applied sciences, of research and development, as well as first steps in mar-
keting new technologies. Bulgaria will be unable to absorb, disseminate and use
imported innovations without certain minimum of innovation potential. This will
be the main role of Bulgarian innovation policy in the coming years and decades.
The state innovation policy can assist in establishing proactive innovation
development in many areas: development of an appropriate set of economic
incentives for innovation activity (subsidies, tax relief, etc.), developing research
in public research institutes, establishments of higher education and subsidising
research in private research establishments. The same applies to help increasing
the efficiency and the scale of private investment in innovation, supporting effec-
tive working relations among the participants in the innovation system, simplify-
ing regulation where necessary and maximising deregulation of everything else
in innovation activities.
The establishment and development of hi-tech innovation enterprises and of
small regional R&D facilities must be encouraged. The initiation of strategic
alliances between Bulgarian high-tech innovation companies and foreign high-
tech companies must be facilitated.
When providing subsidies for public and private innovation activity, one
must seek appropriate trade-offs between government subsidies and company
resources. This is particularly relevant for private innovation companies, so as
not to crowd out private investment. One must target a ratio of financing sources
that guarantees the complementarity of public and private investment which
avoids their mutual substitution. Business practice in developed countries proves
that the share of government investment should not exceed 25-30% of total
investment in the respective innovation projects.
Public expenditures for innovations in Bulgaria will most probably prevail in
the next 5-7 years while the share of private expenditures will grow. Judging by
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020the experience of developed countries, the two sources will reach equal shares by
2010 and by 2015-2020 private expenditure would account for 60-70% of the
total.
Public funding will remain significant for a long time due to the weakness
of private research facilities and their focus on highly profitable projects with
short payback periods. Activities of longer-term significance, particularly those
where private sector benefits are much lower than the public benefits should be
funded by the state as they are not attractive to the private sector. Such projects
are valuable to society and must be financed.
Innovation projects in the area of defence, healthcare, environment protec-
tion and fundamental research will be a prerogative of the state for many years to
come for obvious reasons. The same applies to high-risk innovation investment.
These can attract private resources but must be supported by state participation
and/or state guarantees. If not, private capital will avoid high-risk projects.
Funding of innovation activities and particularly public funding is needed
not only for direct technological and other solutions that lead to the creation of
products of short and medium-term importance. It is even more important for
Bulgaria’s preparation to absorb and implement imported innovations and
become a part of the international innovation networks. Countries with low
innovation activity are not capable of understanding and using imported techni-
cal and other innovations. It is essential that Bulgaria does not remain a passive
observer of the global innovation processes. To prevent this from happening we
recommend a significant increase in research expenditures from 0.5% of GDP in
2000 to 1.4% in 2010 and 2.5% by 2020.
2.3.7. POLICY ON UPDATING OF PRODUCTION PATTERNS
Active intersectoral restructuring hasbeen takingplace in Bulgaria over the
last 50 years. The share of agriculture has been declining in favour of industry
and services. The share of industry first stabilised and over the past 10-15 years
started declining in favour of services.
This process will go on in the next 20 years. The share of agriculture and
forestry will decline to 5-7% of GDP and of the work force by 2020. This will
lead to a significant increase of productivity in the economy as a whole and in
agriculture but will make redundant the majority of the employed in agriculture
with harsh social consequences. The process will be active until 2015-2020 and
will then decelerate.
Industry (mining, processing, power generation, gas, water and construc-
tion) will continue to lose its share both in production and in employment, to
reach 22-24% by 2020.
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Ivan AngelovThe services sector will develop fastest and will absorb the workforce
released from agriculture and industry. It may account for 69-71% of GDP by
2020 and will have a similar share in employment.
The dynamics of production adjustment in the coming years will increasing-
ly move from the intersectoral to the intrasectoral area. The structural changes
within industry, services and agriculture will be the most intensive - sub-sec-
toral and product adjustments.
Nowadays Bulgaria produces and exports primitive low added value
goods, which are capital intensive, energy intensive and unskilled labour inten-
sive. Their content of skilled labour and high technology is very low. The share of
high-tech products is insignificant. A very large part of Bulgarian exports (30-
40%) consists of simple labour intensive goods of low added value, subcontract-
ed by western companies to Bulgarian manufacturers – the so-called outsourc-
ing. They are made with designs and materials of the customer using low cost
labour and cheaper energy in Bulgaria.
As a future EU member Bulgaria must develop its sectoral, sub-sectoral
and product profile. The question is whether the structural menu should be
compiled based on the current sectors, sub-sectors and products with the respec-
tive comparative economic advantages. These sectors are low tech, resource
intensive, energy intensive (with cheap energy) and labour intensive (with low
salaries). In other words Bulgaria would confine itself to the framework of low-
tech sectors and products. This may currently be an inevitable choice, due to
the cheap energy and labour that generates some income, but will be wrong in
the medium and particularly in the long-term.
Bulgaria has to make a great strategic move in the structural reorientation
of its economy over the next 20 years. In view of the current and to a certain
extent - the medium term realities Bulgaria will be forced to sustain its profile in
low-tech operations by constantly renewing them with new products of medium,
high and top level technology. The share of labour intensive low-tech goods can
be reduced to some 15-20%, resource intensive low tech products - to 15-20%,
medium level technology products should be increased to 40-45% and high-tech
products to about 20-25% by 2020. This will be a very difficult structural trans-
formation. It is, however, indispensable because no accelerated development is
possible without it.
From the point of view of export efficiency, attention should be focused on
producing more complex machines and installations, electromechanical and
optical machines and installations, more complex transport machines and
equipment, pharmaceuticals, ecologically clean agricultural products etc.
Management of the companies will make the specific decisions on structural
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020readjustment. They have to formulate their priorities independently. Any
attempt of public authorities to impose them would be inappropriate.
The existing energy sector development strategy must be revised. It is not
based on an overall long-term strategy for Bulgarian economic development
and, therefore, on an estimate for future domestic energy consumption. Energy
saving policy in the consuming sectors has not been incorporated in this strategy.
No reliable investigations have been conducted on the long-term electricity
needs in the neighbouring countries.
The new energy strategy until 2020 must be based on a more economical
use of energy in the business and the household sector, the development of gas
distribution and supply, and environmentally appropriate methods of power
generation. It is cheaper to focus on rationalising energy consumption rather
than increasing power generation based on imported primary energy sources at
unpredictable prices.
Major structural readjustment is needed in the service sector. It is insuffi-
cient to state that the share of services will grow at the expense of agriculture and
industry. The type of services to be developed is more important. The rapid growth
of security services (private bodyguard armies outnumbering state army and police
by a factor of 2.0-2.5), the mushrooming parasite intermediary activities, the old-
fashioned transport services, the abundance of primitive trade and restaurant ser-
vices is a ground for concern. This is an evidence of the backward level of the ser-
vices sector and unhealthy developments in the economy and society.
World experience demonstrates that it is more reasonable to develop mod-
ern services of the ICT-related type, modern healthcare, education, pre-school
facilities and childcare. The same goes for research, other innovation activities,
modern recreation facilities, services for the elderly, intensive tourism, financial
intermediation, modern business services, protection of the environment etc.
This is what the advanced European countries are doing.
There will be important adjustments with severe consequences in the geo-
graphic structure of business activities. As already stated, accelerated develop-
ment will be the major focus for Bulgaria in the coming 20 years and beyond.
High-speed growth can be generated in existing growth centres - mainly in
regions and communities that offer favourable conditions – modern production
capacities, telecommunications, transport, technical, social and other infrastruc-
ture, qualified personnel and market proximity.
The most intensive development in the coming years and decades will
occur in the big cities – Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Bourgas, and other larger towns
and will be least intensive in the small towns, in the villages, mountainous
regions with poor infrastructure and human resources.
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Ivan AngelovThe internal regional divergence in Bulgaria will grow until 2020-2030.
This is inevitable but policies can be initiated to mitigate the negative implica-
tions. This calls for partially compensating preventive measures by the authori-
ties at both national and regional level. The Bulgarian public must be informed
about this trend and be prepared to face the consequences!
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Strategy for Accelerated Economic Development of Bulgaria by 2020